

**Before The  
Federal Communications Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20554**

In the Matter of	)	
	)	
Implementation of the	)	
Telecommunications Act of 1996:	)	
	)	
Telecommunications Carriers' Use of	)	CC Docket No. 96-115
Customer Proprietary Network	)	
Information And Other Customer	)	
Information;	)	
	)	
Implementation of the Non-Accounting	)	CC Docket No. 96-149
Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the	)	
Communications Act of 1934, As Amended;	)	
	)	
2000 Biennial Regulatory Review-	)	CC Docket No. 00-257
Review of Policies and Rules Concerning	)	
Unauthorized Changes of Consumers' Long	)	
Distance Carriers	)	

**THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION'S  
OPPOSITION TO THE PETITIONS OF VERIZON AND AT&T WIRELESS  
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE THIRD REPORT AND ORDER  
IN CC DOCKET 96-115**

Pursuant to Section 1.429(f) of the Federal Communications Commission's (the "Commission" or "FCC") rules, the Arizona Corporation Commission ("ACC") hereby submits this Opposition to the Petitions for Reconsideration of the Commission's *Third R&O* filed by Verizon Communications Inc., and AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. ("AT&T"). Specifically, the ACC requests that the Commission not reconsider its decision that State regulations that are inconsistent with the Commission's will not be presumed preempted but will be considered for preemption on a case-by-case basis.

**I. Introduction**

Verizon and AT&T ask the Commission to reconsider its order and to make clear that all state rules applying standards not consistent with those of the Commission are presumptively preempted.<sup>1</sup> Verizon, relying primarily on the *Computer II* case, argues that the goal of the Commission's regulatory scheme will be thwarted by any State regulation that is

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<sup>1</sup> See *Verizon's Petition for Reconsideration of Third Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-115* at 1, October 21, 2002 (Verizon Petition).

inconsistent with the Commission's.<sup>2</sup> AT&T asserts that the Commission has two bases for presumptive preemption: (1) the cost to carriers of complying with differing State and Federal regulation, and; (2) "the Commission's own interpretation of the First Amendment's application in the CPNI context provides a strong reason to ensure that states do not impose undue burden on carrier's commercial speech."<sup>3</sup> The ACC believes that during their consideration of CPNI regulation States may have before them a record that demands an approach different from that of the Commission in order to achieve a proper balance between privacy rights of consumers and the burden imposed on carrier's commercial free speech rights. Further, the ACC believes while the costs of complying with both Federal and State law could be considered it is not a consideration which by itself demands presumptive preemption.

## **II. States May Adopt More Restrictive CPNI Approaches Than the FCC's Which Pass Constitutional Muster Under *Central Hudson*.**

In its *Third R&O*,<sup>4</sup> the Commission adopted an approach to its enforcement of section 222 of the 1996 Act, which it believes comports with the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's holding that any approach to enforcement of the provision must meet the test for protection of commercial free speech announced in *Central Hudson*.<sup>5</sup> The Commission adopted its CPNI policy balancing competing privacy, competitive, and First Amendment rights, based on the record before it. As stated by the Commission, the Commission "must acknowledge that states may develop different records should they choose to examine the use of CPNI for intrastate services."<sup>6</sup> In declaring its intent to review state CPNI rules for preemption on a case-by-case basis the Commission properly recognized that a state commission may have before it a record that would allow the state to impose constitutional, stricter regulations regarding CPNI notice and disclosure.

The Commission reconfirmed its earlier decision to preempt state regulation "where such regulation would negate the Commission's exercise of its lawful authority because

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<sup>2</sup> Verizon Petition at 7-9.

<sup>3</sup> AT&T Petition at 4-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information*; Third Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-115, FCC 02-214 (rel. July 25, 2002) (Third R&O").

<sup>5</sup> *U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC*, 182 F.3d 1224 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999), *Cert. denied*, 530 U.S. 1213 (June 5, 2000).

<sup>6</sup> *Id.* at ¶ 71.

regulation of the interstate aspects of the matter cannot be severed from regulation of the intrastate aspects.”<sup>7</sup> In its Third Report and Order, however, the Commission removed any presumption that more stringent state CPNI requirements would be “vulnerable to preemption.”<sup>8</sup>

As a result of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in *U.S. West v. FCC*, any approach adopted by either the FCC or a state commission must survive the scrutiny of a *Central Hudson* analysis.<sup>9</sup> This analysis must take into account the burden of the selected approach on protected commercial speech, balancing carriers’ commercial speech rights with consumers’ privacy rights. The State must be guided by the facts in the record before it. In the course of its investigation, the State may find more evidence of harm to consumers, less burden of commercial speech, or a higher privacy interest reflected in its record than that reflected on the FCC’s record. Any one, or a combination of any of these findings, shifts the balance between carrier commercial speech rights and consumer privacy rights and may lead a state to the supportable conclusion, based on its own *Central Hudson* analysis, that stricter approaches to protection of consumer CPNI are not constitutionally forbidden based on its record. The record in Arizona’s consideration of CPNI illustrates this point.

#### **A. More Evidence of Harm**

Arizona’s record shows that Qwest did not provide a bilingual notification or access to bilingual operators in its opt-out program for the twenty-five percent of Qwest’s Arizona customers who speak Spanish. The opt-out notice was included in information concerning the implementation of new area codes, and so it was often overlooked as customers read the area code information but did not read the CPNI notice. The notice did not make clear to whom CPNI would be released and how it would be used by the receiving party. The net effect of these shortcomings is that consumers are harmed because they have been afforded no real opportunity to protect their privacy interest in their CPNI as required under Section 222.

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<sup>7</sup> Third CPNI Order at ¶ 69 quoting *Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information; and Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended*, Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd 8061 (1998) (*CPNI Order*).

<sup>8</sup> Third CPNI Order at ¶ 70.

<sup>9</sup> See *U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC*, 182 F.3d 1224 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999), *Cert. denied*, 530 U.S. 1213 (June 5, 2000).

## **B. Less Burden on Carrier Speech**

The state may adopt an approach concerning a particular disclosure of CPNI that has less burden on speech. Arizona, in its petition for reconsideration, has asked the Commission to reconsider its stance on release of CPNI to unaffiliated third parties.<sup>10</sup> The ACC, based on its record, finds that carriers are not currently engaged in the release of CPNI to unaffiliated third parties. The ACC believes it would be difficult, if not impossible, to adequately inform the customer of all of the potential disclosures that could occur under a policy which allowed disclosure to any unrelated third party without written consent prior to each specific release. Because carriers in Arizona have indicated they are not currently engaged in such disclosure, the burden on speech would be minimal.

## **C. Increased Privacy Interests**

States may have established an interest in privacy beyond that provided under the Federal Constitution. For instance, as specifically noted by the FCC,<sup>11</sup> Arizona citizens enjoy a state constitutional right to privacy.<sup>12</sup> Consideration of Arizonans' rights to privacy in their CPNI led the Arizona Legislature to provide "that, notwithstanding any other law, customer information, account information and related proprietary information are confidential unless specifically waived by the customer in writing."<sup>13</sup> Arizona consumers have expressed serious concerns regarding dissemination of their CPNI by carriers in Arizona. Their constitution and statutes reflect an interest in the protection of their private affairs that is greater than that afforded them by their federal constitution and laws. Because States may develop different records in their examination of CPNI for intrastate services, the FCC's choice not to apply an automatic presumption is the correct one.

## **III. Inconsistent State CPNI Regulation Will Not Necessarily Interfere With the Goal of the FCC's CPNI Regulatory Scheme.**

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<sup>10</sup> Arizona Corporation Commission's Petition for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of the Third CPNI Order, November 7, 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Third CPNI Order at ¶71 n.164.

<sup>12</sup> Article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."

<sup>13</sup> A.R.S. § 40-202.C.5.

Verizon relies on the justifications expressed by the FCC, and agreed with by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,<sup>14</sup> for preempting inconsistent state regulation respecting the tariffing of CPE,<sup>15</sup> to support its argument that the Commission must preempt all inconsistent CPNI regulation.<sup>16</sup> The justification advanced by the Commission in *Computer II* was that the “objectives of the *Computer II* scheme would be frustrated by state tariffing of CPE.”<sup>17</sup> The Commission in *Computer II*, found that the “efficient utilization and full exploitation of the interstate telecommunications network” was advanced by encouraging competition in the CPE market.<sup>18</sup> The Commission found that only when CPE and transmission charges were completely separate would customers select the CPE most suited to that individual customer from among the competitors marketing CPE.<sup>19</sup> The Commission concluded that inclusion of any CPE charges, whether CPE used for intrastate or for interstate purposes, would influence consumer choice and be harmful to competition.<sup>20</sup> The Commission’s approach to advancing competition in the CPE market was to adopt a federal regulatory scheme of removing CPE from tariffs. The only way to ensure CPE was no longer tariffed was to preempt states from doing so. The D.C. Circuit agreed, stating that “when state regulation of intrastate equipment or facilities would interfere with achievement of a federal regulatory goal, the Commission’s jurisdiction is paramount and conflicting state regulations must necessarily yield to the federal regulatory scheme.”<sup>21</sup>

The goal of the federal regulatory scheme concerning CPNI is to adopt a method of customer notice and approval while “balanc[ing] carriers’ First Amendment rights and consumers’ privacy interests so as to permit carriers flexibility in their communications with their customers while providing the level of protection to consumers’ privacy interests that Congress envisioned under section 222.”<sup>22</sup> As the Commission has noted, and the ACC has affirmed above, a record may be established at the State level that causes some shift in the

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<sup>14</sup> See *Computer and Communications Industry Ass’n v. FCC*, 693 F.2d 198 (1982).

<sup>15</sup> *Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations* (“Computer II”), Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512, ¶ 83 n.34 (1981).

<sup>16</sup> See Verizon Petition at pp. 7-12.

<sup>17</sup> *Computer and Communications Industry Ass’n v. FCC*, 693 F.2d at 214.

<sup>18</sup> *Computer II Final Decision*, 77 F.C.C.2d at 429.

<sup>19</sup> *Id.* at 442-43.

<sup>20</sup> See *id.*

<sup>21</sup> *Id.*

<sup>22</sup> Third CPNI Order at ¶ 1.

balance between the carrier's First Amendment rights and consumer's CPNI privacy interests, such as a demonstration of increased harm to the consumer, a higher privacy interest based on State law, or a lesser burden on carrier speech. A State may reasonably conclude based on such a record that an approach different from that adopted by the FCC, possibly an approach requiring opt-in and/or an approach requiring opt-in for each disclosure to any unaffiliated third party, properly balances the competing interests and fulfills the goal of Section 222 of the Act. In other words, there are different approaches to achieve the same regulatory goal of Section 222. Unlike, the CPE tariffing case, these approaches can co-exist without interfering with one another.

It is also important to note that the preemption issue considered in *Computer II* was not whether or not the FCC was required to preempt, but rather the issues concerned the FCC's jurisdiction and justification for preemption.<sup>23</sup> The holding of the case means that the FCC has the jurisdiction to and with justification may preempt inconsistent state law when that state law would interfere with achievement of a federal regulatory goal. It does not stand for the proposition that under any particular set of facts the FCC must presumptively preempt inconsistent state regulation. The ACC believes it is clearly within the Commission's discretion to choose to review inconsistent state law for preemption on a case-by-case basis. It is particularly appropriate for the Commission to do so when it is clearly within the realm of possibility, as it is here, that differing State and Federal Regulation may co-exist and work toward the same regulatory goal.

#### **IV. The Cost to Carriers of Complying With Inconsistent State Law Should Not Determine the FCC's Preemption Approach.**

AT&T argues that the *Third R&O* has eliminated an existing presumption of preemption without determining whether the cost burdens supporting the prior presumption of preemption had lessened.<sup>24</sup> The ACC does not believe it was necessary for the Commission to determine the burden of complying with different state CPNI approaches had lessened in its consideration of the *Third R&O* to have reasonably

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<sup>23</sup> See *Computer II*, 693 F.2d at 214.

<sup>24</sup> AT&T Petition at 4.

concluded the presumption should be removed. In its *Second R&O*, the Commission adopted an opt-in approach to the notice and disclosure of consumer CPNI. In that context, the Commission also stated that any state CPNI regulation containing stricter limitations would be “vulnerable to preemption.”<sup>25</sup> On reconsideration of the *Second R&O*, the Commission again stated that additional limitations would be subject to preemption while affirming its intent to implement an opt-in approach.<sup>26</sup>

The Commission noted in the *Third R&O* that under the opt-in approach adopted in the *Second R&O*, “the only more restrictive approach that could be adopted ... would be express written approval.”<sup>27</sup> Because express written approval was the only more restrictive method open to the States, the Commission stated its intent to preempt any more restrictive limitations. In other words, the Commission stated it would preempt any requirement that a carrier obtain express written consent. With the introduction into the balance of the *Central Hudson* analysis by the Tenth Circuit, the Commission adopted an opt-out approach to all but third party release.

The States now may choose a more restrictive approach to CPNI notice and disclosure by adopting an opt-in approach in some or all of those instances where the Commission has adopted an opt-out approach. The Commission has appropriately adapted its preemption approach to take into account the additional options available to the States. As the Commission has clearly stated, and as is detailed above, it is entirely possible for a State to find based on the record produced in its investigation into carrier CPNI practices, that opt-in serves the substantial state interest of protection of the CPNI

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<sup>25</sup> *Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Network information and Other Customer Information; Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, As Amended*, CC Docket Nos. 96-115, 96-149, *Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, 13 FCC Rcd 8061, ¶ 16 (1998) (“*Second R&O*”).

<sup>26</sup> *Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Information and Other Customer Information; Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, As Amended*, CC Docket Nos. 96-115, 96-149, *Order on Reconsideration and Petitions for Forbearance*, 14 FCC Rcd 14409, ¶ 112 (1999) (“*Reconsideration Order*”).

<sup>27</sup> *Third R&O* at ¶ 70.

privacy rights and is no more extensive than necessary to protect that interest. The Commission's decision to presume preemption where State's CPNI regulation required express written approval, and to not presume preemption where it is entirely possible a State's record may support an opt-in approach is reasonable. It is this issue, and not the cost issue that has driven the Commission's past and present decisions on preemption. Therefore, the Commission is not compelled to make any cost finding before changing its order regarding presumptive preemption.

Notably, it is not the Commission's approach to preemption that causes any additional carrier expense from compliance with differing CPNI approaches. The carrier is free to utilize a consistent approach throughout its territory by adopting the least restrictive approach that satisfies all States in which it operates and applying that approach throughout its territory. Further, it is unclear to the ACC that carriers will be burdened with any additional cost burden of consequence if complying with differing CPNI regulations. Carriers have presented no evidence in Arizona, or at the FCC, that complying with differing State CPNI regulation causes any consequential increase in cost.

## **V. Conclusion**

The Commission's decision to consider preemption on a case-by-case basis with no presumption of preemption is reasonable considering the possible eventuality of a State's being presented with a record indicating opt-in to be a narrowly tailored approach properly balancing carriers' commercial speech and consumers' CPNI privacy interests. State CPNI regulation, even if more limiting than the FCC's, can co-exist with the FCC's without interfering with the FCC's goal of protecting consumer's privacy interests. The decision properly adapts the Commission's preemption approach to fit its shift from an opt-out approach to an opt-in approach. The removal of the presumption correctly



recognizes that State commissions may now adopt a more limiting approach without requiring the consumer's express written approval. The carriers have not demonstrated any consequential financial burden of complying with differing State and Federal CPNI regulation and may negate any such financial burden by choosing an approach that satisfies both the State and Federal regulations in its operating territory and applying that approach throughout. The ACC urges the Commission to decline to reconsider its *Third R&O* as it pertains to the removal of a presumption of preemption of inconsistent State CPNI regulations.

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that I have this 24th day of December, served all parties to this action with a copy of the foregoing OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION by placing a true and correction copy of the same in the United States Mail, Postage prepaid, addressed to the parties listed below:

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